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Elicitation of Strategies in Four Variants of a
Round-robin Tournament: The case of
Goofspiel
Moshe Dror and Graham Kendall, Senior Member, IEEE and Amnon Rapoport.
Abstract—Goofspiel is a simple two-person zero-sum
game for which there exist no known equilibrium strategies.
To gain insight into what constitute winning strategies,
we conducted a round-robin tournament in which par-
ticipants were asked to provide computerized programs
for playing the game with or without carryover. Each
of these two variants was to be played under two quite
different objective functions, namely, maximization of the
cumulative number of points won across all opponents
(as in Axelrod’s tournament), and maximization of the
probability of winning any given round. Our results show
that there are, indeed, inherent differences in the results
with respect to the complexity of the game and its objective
function, and that winning strategies exhibit a level of
sophistication, depth, and balance that are not captured
by present models of adaptive learning.
Index Terms—Goofspiel, strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Goofspiel is a two-person zero-sum card game [38],
[39], where points won by one player are effectively lost
by the other player. The rules are very simple, yet the
game presents computational challenges that are yet to
be resolved. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no
known optimal winning strategies for Goofspiel against
an opponent using an arbitrary strategy.
In an attempt to gain insight into what constitute
winning strategies for Goofspiel, [11] solicited fourteen
computer programs (play strategies) written by graduate
students in Management Information Systems and
Computer Science and pitted them one against the other
in a round-robin tournament. None of the 14 programs
in the competition reported in [11] dominated all other
programs. Moreover, the most successful program had
inferior results against another program that overall
performed rather poorly. Evidently, we have not learned
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how to play Goofspiel. Using a similar methodology, the
purpose of the present paper is to examine a sequence
of round-robin tournaments with two major extensions
of the classical Goofspiel game that vary both the
degree of complexity of the game and its objective
function. Our purpose is to determine the properties of
successful strategies for playing Goofspiel.
Axelrod [2] presents the results of the earliest
well-known round-robin tournament of computerized
strategies. His ground-breaking work has been motivated
by the desire to find an answer to the question of what
is the most effective strategy for playing the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (see [24] for a discussion
on recent work). For that purpose, Axelrod invited game
theorists, all familiar with the topic, to enter a round-
robin finitely iterated PD game tournament designed to
determine which strategies perform best in practice. In a
second version of this PD tournament played a few years
later, the rules of the competition were the same with
the only exception that the exact number of iterations
was not disclosed in advance. Thoughtful summaries
and discussions of this research have been provided by
[18], [27], [29], and many others. Subsequent research
has extended the same methodology to other games
(e.g., [7]), including variants of the PD game with an
exit option [28], or finite memory ([22]. Although the
present Goofspiel study shares the same methodology
as the PD earlier studies, the conclusions that it draws
about winning strategies in this class of two-person
zero-sum games are quite different.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In Section
II, we state the rules of the classical Goofspiel game.
In Section III, we describe and discuss two of its
extensions. Section IV summarizes several observations
about learning in zero-sum games. The experimental
framework is presented in Section V. The results of the
competition are summarized in Section VI. Section VII
concludes. The outline of the format of the computer
program and software framework are the same as in
[11], and are omitted from this paper.
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Readers interested in the more detailed description
of the computer strategies provided by the participants
and/or the original 32 tables of the results for all the
competitions in the tournament should access the sup-
plementary file associated with this paper.
II. GOOFSPIEL
In the standard (classical) Goofspiel game there are
two players. One of the four suits is given to player I ,
a different suit to player II , and a third suit is shuffled
and placed face down between the two players. The
fourth suit is discarded and plays no further role in the
game.
The game starts by revealing the top card from the
shuffled suit, that has been placed between the two
players. Each of the two players selects one of their
cards as a bid for the value of the upturned card. These
bids are made simultaneously. The player who selects
a card with a higher value than their opponent wins
the face-up card. In case of a tie between the two
player’s cards, the three exposed cards are discarded
and no player wins any point. If one player has selected
a higher card then his opponent, he keeps the card
for accounting purposes. The two cards played by the
players are discarded. Another card is now revealed and
the game is repeated until all 13 face down cards have
been exposed. We refer to this 13-card sequence as a
round. The number of rounds is determined by the two
players before the game commences.
In any given round, the player with the higher total
value of cards won is the winner of that round. The
numerical difference between the two players’ total val-
ues is called the winning margin (or point differential).
The objective in classical Goofspiel is to maximize the
cumulative points won across all the rounds against a
given opponent. With the cards in each suit marked from
1 to 13 (Ace = 1, 2 = 2, . . . , 10 = 10, J = 11, Q =
12,K = 13), there is a fixed number of points (at most
91-1 = 90) to be won in each round. The value is 90, as
when a player, plays their King, they are guaranteed to
win the up card. This is at least an Ace (one point). Of
course, in case of a tie(s) some (or even all) of the points
in each round may be wasted. Importantly, maximizing
the cumulative sum of the points won and maximizing
the number of rounds won against an opponent are two
different objectives; player i, (i = I, II) may accumulate
a higher total number of points than her opponent
j, (j = I, II, i 6= j), while player j records a higher
number of wins. We discuss this issue below.
In contrast to Games with Finite Resources [16], the
payoffs in Goofspiel are revealed at each move, one
at a time. Therefore, there is no static payoff matrix
because the pair of the cards chosen in each move is
stochastic with respect to the payoff value.
Ross [30] notes that the number of pure strategies
for each player is, nn×Πn−1k=1kk(k+1). For example, the
number of pure strategies for n = 4 for Goofspiel is 8.4
billion (an 8.4 billion by 8.4 billion game). For n = 5
the number of pure strategies goes up to about 1023
[30]. Moreover, a ‘successful’ Goofspiel strategy must
include randomization since it can be shown that any
deterministic strategy can be easily defeated. The above
4-card example illustrates the computational challenge
of constructing effective strategies for Goofspiel.
Only a few theoretical results for Goofspiel are known
[30]. For instance, if Player I observes that Player II
chooses her card at random in each turn, then to maxi-
mize her expected payoff value in a repeated Goofspiel,
Player I should match the upturned value with their
own card value [10]. This is known as the the upcard-
matching strategy or in short the Matching Strategy –
(MS).
III. EXTENSIONS
As mentioned earlier, the focus of our study is on
identifying effective strategies for two major extensions
of Goofspiel, one concerned with the complexity of the
game and the other with its objective function. In what
follows we describe these two extensions in some detail.
A. Goofspiel with Carryover
The first extension (or variant) of the classical
Goofspiel, which we term Goofspiel tournament
with carryover, was introduced in [30]. The difference
between the classical and carryover variants of Goofspiel
is quite simple. In the carryover variant, if both players
I and II bid the same value (i.e., a tie) for a given
exposed card in step t, provided that step t is not the
last step in the sequence, then the value of the exposed
card in step t is added to the value of the next exposed
card in step t + 1 and the game continues as before. If
a tie occurs on the last exposed card in the round, then
no player wins the last value. Despite this minor change
in the rules in case of a tie, its effect on the complexity
of the game is profound. Ross claims that Goofspiel
with carryover is a much more difficult game to analyze
or even compute the number of pure strategies. To our
knowledge, there are no published results on Goofspiel
with carryover. Using a 2× 2 within-subject design, the
present study reports the results of both the classical
and carryover variants of the game. Each of these two
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variants is played in a round-robin tournament under
two different objective functions.
B. Objective Functions
To motivate these two objective functions we re-
examined the round-robin tournament reported in [2]. In
this first tournament, Axelrod invited professional game
theorists to write computer programs that participated
in a round-robin tournament for exactly 200 moves (a
game) against each opponent.
Axelrod reported that TIT-FOR-TAT (TFT), the sim-
plest of the 14 programs that had been submitted, won
the tournament ([2], p. 31). To remind the reader, TFT
chooses the cooperative strategy at step t = 1. There-
after, at each t it mimics the opponent’s move at step
t − 1. TFT is not the first to defect, but it is not the
first to cooperate either except by design on step t = 1.
TFT only carries a memory of the outcome of the last
step, plays each move as if it is the last in the game,
and learns nothing about its opponent during the entire
course of the game. TFT cannot win any particular round
with another strategy. It can, at best, tie. It is able to win
on total points by losing to many opponents, but still
getting a relatively high score The opponents then get
lower scores against other opponents. Given this, if we
evaluate TFT on pairwise wins, it would perform poorly.
Analyzing the results from that first tournament shows
that if we produce rankings (number of wins versus
total number of points) a Spearman rank correlation
between the two rankings is rs = −0.154. On the
basis of this result, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the two rankings in Axelrod’s first tournament are
independent (p > 0.05).
One might possibly expect that the two objective
functions of maximizing the probability of winning
against any given program and maximizing the total
number of points won across all the opponents in a
round-robin tournament are not perfectly correlated. But
the finding reported above that in the first tournament
of Axelrod these two objectives are not significantly
correlated may come as a surprise. To further assess
the generality of this finding, we searched for another
tournament between computer programs playing iterated
PD games with possibly different rules and a larger
number of participants. Such a round-robin tournament
was presented in [21]. In contrast to the tournament
organized by Axelrod in 1984, the tournament in
2004 allowed for the addition of random noise, which
resulted in the misrepresentation of some of the moves.
Additionally, teams of genuine players could submit
multiple programs and many did so. Altogether, the
2004 tournament included 223 computer programs
[21]. The results of the tournament are displayed
in http://www.prisoners-dilemma.com/results/cec04.
Fortunately, both the number of pairwise competitions
won by each of the 223 programs and the total sum
of the number of points won across all the program’s
opponents are listed in the website. The correlation
between the two scores (the number of competitions
won and the total sum of the number of points won
for n = 223) is r = −0.45; it is negative and highly
significant (p < 0.001).
Jointly evaluated, these results suggest that to achieve
generality in answering the basic research question of
the present paper, more than a single explication of
successful strategies should be explored. In what follows,
for both the classical and carryover variants of Goof-
spiel tournaments, we present the results of round-robin
tournaments under two different objective functions. One
version has the objective of maximizing the cumulative
value of exposed cards won against each opponent
(of great consequence in zero-sum games), and in the
other, simpler, version the objective is to maximize the
probability of winning in each round.
IV. COMMENTS ON LEARNING IN GAMES
Automated game playing has a long history that can
be traced back to at least the 1950’s [34], [32]. Samuel
pioneered learning in games via the co-evolution of a
checkers player [32], [33], where a population of agents
played against each other in order to evolve ever better
players. It was Samuel’s work, as well as the recent de-
feat of Kasparov by Deep Blue [9], that motivated Fogel
[12] to continue this challenge. He utilized evolutionary
artificial neural networks as checkers board evaluators.
The final player evolved by Fogel was able to play at
the level of a human expert [13].
Fogel’s work motivated other researchers to continue
investigating learning methodologies for checkers [1],
as well as investigating evolutionary neural networks
for other games, such Blackjack [20], Pac-Man [25]
and Go [8]. The methodology has also been used in
other domains, such as predicting share prices [35], and
forecasting inflation [3].
A co-evolutionary approach has been compared to
Temporal Difference Learning (TDL) in evaluating Oth-
ello positions [26]. It found that TDL learns faster than a
co-evolutionary approach although a suitably tuned co-
evolutionary algorithm is able to learn better strategies,
demonstrating that more research is needed to establish
the most suitable algorithm. Indeed, recently Monte
Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) [5] has attracted significant
attention in game playing, motivated by its success in
Computer Go [23], with games such as poker [31] being
highlighted as being able to benefit from MCTS.
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When playing repeated two-person games, it is com-
mon for the players to attempt learning how to play the
game (improve their game performance) as the game
progresses by forming beliefs about their opponents’
strategies based on the history of play. Learning how to
play games is an important topic with a vast literature.
Major examples include reinforcement-based and belief-
based models of adaptive learning, as well as models
that postulate minimization of regret. However, these
models are not suited to capture the sophistication and
complexity of game strategies that experts employ in
playing Goofspiel. They assume myopic behavior, sta-
tionary environments, and parameter values that remain
fixed over iterations of the stage game; these attributes
do not characterize many real-life conflicts, even one as
simple as Goofspiel.
The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
two-person zero-sum games is usually claimed by ref-
erence to Zermelo’s Theorem (see [36]). However, Zer-
melo’s Theorem does not apply to Goofspiel because
of the uncertainty introduced by the simultaneous card
selection of both players. Since we know that no pure
strategy may consistently outperform general strategies
in Goofspiel (there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
for Goofspiel), we ought to consider learning mixed
strategies see [15]. However, non-stationarity in the
opponent’s strategies in Goofspiel derails the known
classical approaches in the literature on learning in
games. Subsequently, we are forced to resort to ex-
perimental examinations and computational search for
successful Goofspiel playing strategies by conducting
computerized round- robin competitions as described in
[11] and extended in this paper.
V. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we discuss the 4×4×2 round-robin
competitions that were conducted in the course of this
study. Each player submitted 4 different versions of
Goofspiel. Each version participated in 4 round-robin
competitions of 10, 20, 30, and 50 rounds. For each
version, we calculated the number of points and the
numbers of rounds won for a total of 32 tables. Their
tabulated results are presented in 32 tables which are
available in the supplementary file. Each of the 32 tables
reflects the results of a single, 11-player, round-robin
Goofspiel competition specified by the winning criterion
(objective function), the specific form of Goofspiel
(with or without carryover), and the number of rounds
played by each pair of programs. Each entry in these
tables reports the point differential between a pair of
players in a single execution of a specific competition
with a fixed number of rounds. For illustration, Table I
presents the results of a 10-round round-robin Goofspiel
with carryover competition when the players’ objective
is to maximize the cumulative number of points won
across the ten rounds against each opponent. Table I
shows that program 0209 won in 10 rounds against
RANDOM with a point differential of 307 points.
Program 0203 won by total of 42 points more than
RANDOM when playing ten rounds, but lost by a total
of 126 points against program 0209 and by a total of
134 points against program 0205.
TABLE I
SCORE(P1-P2) - CARRYOVER MAXIMIZING POINTS - 10 ROUNDS
HHHHHP1
P2
Random 0209 0205 0203 0210 0207 0206 0202 0204 0208 0201
Random - - - - - - - - - - -
0209 307 - - - - - - - - - -
0205 102 188 - - - - - - - - -
0203 42 -126 -134 - - - - - - - -
0210 68 -136 -27 10 - - - - - - -
0207 -20 154 24 -244 2 - - - - - -
0206 186 -254 -2 66 -247 198 - - - - -
0202 136 83 -223 -17 -2 16 72 - - - -
0204 212 -207 -207 -55 -142 15 -144 -86 - - -
0208 195 190 -19 -54 65 -22 243 204 302 - -
0201 260 358 51 136 166 -49 256 132 213 93 -
The computer programs were submitted by ten Ph.D.
students from the University of Arizona. We have added
the random card selection strategy (RANDOM) to each
round-robin competition as a benchmark strategy. The
competitions were held with 10, 20, 30, and 50 re-
peated games (rounds) against each opponent in each
competition. Competitions with increasing number of
rounds aim to assess the rate of learning and subsequent
strategy adjustment decisions encoded by the players in
their programs. The players were told that their final
grade in the course would partly be contingent on the
performance of their entries.
A. Short Summary of the Players’ Strategies
This subsection provides a brief summary (the main
idea) of each participant’s playing strategies in our
round-robin competition. More detailed descriptions are
available in the supplementary file associated with this
paper.
The genuine players – programs in the competitions
– are labelled from 0201 to 0210, and Random.
(1) Player 0201 designed her strategy around the
principal idea that the program ought to perform well
when considering five reasonable play strategies that her
opponent is likely (in her judgment) to play.
(2) The logic of Player 0202’s strategy revolves around
the idea of how much risk she ought to play in the current
move. To that end, she calculates four ratios before each
move and uses these ratios in a convex combination to
calculate her daring signal which, in turn, determines her
play card.
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(3) Player 0203 aims to employ on each move either
an offensive strategy, such as playing the upcard value
+x, (x = some nonnegative integer less than 5), or a
defensive strategy, such as randomizing, and alternates
between the two if there is no guaranteed good play.
(4) The strategy submitted by Player 0204 attempts
to imitate the probabilistic play as described by Rhoads
and Bartholdi (2012).
(5) Player 0205 bases her play strategy on a number
of key elements: (i) valuation of cards; (ii) a learning
routine; (iii) bounded random play, and (iv) defense
mechanism against play learning by the opponents. Since
this is the best performing program in our Goofspiel
competition, we examine the reasons for its success in a
subsequent section.
(6) Player 0206 selects her card for each move based
on the ratio of the total number of points earned so far in
the round divided by the total number of points spent so
far in the round. This ratio is referred to as Point Quality.
The intent on every move is to increase the difference of
the two players’ Point Quality values in her favor. The
difference between the Point Quality scores determines
between choosing an aggressive or non-aggressive play.
(7) Player 0207 first determines four intuitive Goof-
spiel strategies. In actual play the four strategies are com-
puted iteratively based on their immediate or consecutive
success or failure.
(8) Player 0208 essentially runs a rolling time horizon
Monte Carlo simulation for two consecutive plays in
each turn to determine her play card. In addition, the
strategy calls at times for random play to guard against
a play-learning opponent.
(9) Player 0209 assumes that her opponent is likely
to select one of five fairly well-known strategies and
attempts to learn from the play history which strategy
was chosen by her opponent in order to respond with
myopic play. It turns out to be one of our most successful
strategies.
(10) Player 0210 opts to sacrifice the first few rounds
by playing randomly so that she may gather data on her
opponents play. Then, she introduces a number of rules
that trigger a degree of aggressive play that also allows
for randomization.
VI. THE COMPETITION
The present section discusses the tabulated results (the
original 32 tables - see the supplementary file) of the
round-robin competition. Many different summaries can
be tabulated based on the 32 basic tables. For instance,
Tables II and III represent one such summary of the
results. Table II depicts the results for Goofspiel with
no carryover (and similarly Table III for Goofspiel with
carryover) for 50-round competitions and the objective
of maximizing the cumulative number of points won
against each opponent in contrast to the objective of
maximizing the number of rounds won against each
opponent. The column labeled % in W. Point Diff.
presents for every player the sum of the positive point
differences against each of this player’s opponents,
dividing (normalizing) this sum by the maximum
points a player can win in such Goofspiel competition
90 × 10 × 10 and 90 × 50 × 10, respectively. For
instance, program 0205 had a winning point differential
in a 50-round tournament of 21.0 % (Table II). It is
the highest point differential indicating the relative
strength of program 0205. A similar interpretation holds
for Table III for Goofspiel with carryover. We note,
however, that in Goofspiel with carryover program 0205
did not achieve the highest % in W.P. Diff. Rather,
Program 0201 had a score of 13.2 versus 10.4 for
program 0205.
Next we turn to Tables IV, V, VI, and VII, for the
count of the number of defeated opponents in the 50
round-competitions. Table IV depicts for each program
the number of opponents defeated by point differential
and by the number of rounds differential for Goofspiel
with no carryover and the objective of maximizing the
total number of rounds won against each opponent in
50-round competitions. Table IV shows that program
0205 defeated all ten opponents by points won in
the 50-round competitions, and nine opponents with
respect to the number of rounds. However, with respect
to rounds it lost to one opponent in the 50-round
competition. From the round-robin results tables we
note that in the 10-round competitions program 0205
did not lose and had one tie. On the other hand,
program 0207 defeated five opponents by points in
the 10-round competitions and six opponents in the
50-round tournament. In addition, program 0207 raised
the number of defeated opponents from 6 to 7 when
switching from the 10 to the 50-round competition.
Regarding Table V with an objective of maximizing
total points, there are three successful programs (0201.
0205, and 0208) that increased the number of defeated
opponents when increasing the number of rounds from
10 to 50-round competitions. Tables VI and VII differ
from Tables IV and V, respectively, by depicting the
results from Goofspiel with carryover instead of the
Goofspiel with no carryover.
For the purpose of identifying the most successful
programs/players, we present in Table VIII for each
player separately a 1 × 16 vector that lists the number
of defeated opponents, ignoring ties, in 16 round-
robin competitions starting with the 8 round-robin
competitions of 10 rounds each in order of the tables,
and followed in the same order by the 8 round-robin
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competitions of 50 rounds each. The entries in bold
in each position in at least one of the 11 vectors
strongly dominate all the non-bold entries in the same
position in corresponding vectors. Program 0205 is by
far the most successful program, with program 0208
second and 0201 third based on the number of the
round robin competitions it dominated as reflected
by the number of defeated programs. However, when
assessing the success of a program by the smallest
number of opponents defeated in any one of the 16
round robing competitions, program 0201 is number
one with a minimum of seven defeated opponents,
followed by 0205 with five, and 0208 with four, which
is also true for 0210. At the other end of the spectrum,
0204 can be judged as the weakest program by virtue
of maximum of four and minimum of one defeated
opponents. We exclude Random from this ranking but
note that Random defeated two opponents in one of the
16 competitions.
In an attempt to identify success patterns, we inspect
the differences in program’s results (the original 32
tables) as a function of the number of rounds in
otherwise identical round-robin competitions. We
note that programs 0205, 0203, and 0204 improve
their success score, depicted by the winning point
differential, when switching from 10 to 50 rounds:
14.5 to 21.0, 3.5 to 5.4, and 3.9 to 6.4 respectively.
Similarly, programs 0205, 0203, and 0204 improve their
success score regarding winning round differential from
47.0, 16.0, 12.0 to 61.6, 16.3, and 20.0, respectively.
Similar improvement is registered for programs 0205,
0202, 0207, and 0206. This observation repeats itself for
programs 0205, 0207, 0202, 0204. It is not entirely clear
what we ‘learn’ from these observations. For instance,
program 0203 has a built-in learning subroutine that
aims to identify if the opponent employs a matching-like
strategy and if so it triggers an optimizing response.
For program 0202, one cannot identify a learning
intent. Program 0205 has some learning and adjusting
response built into the program. However, for Goofspiel
with carryover this ‘learning’ phenomena disappears
when the objective switches to maximization of total
rounds won. That is, as depicted in the bottom half of
Table III, program 0205’s percentage of winning points
differential and % of winning rounds differential both
decrease when the number of round increases from
10 to 50. Therefore, we do not detect a trend of play
improvements as a function of the number of rounds.
If such a phenomenon exists, it is a function of other
factors and not just the number of rounds.
A. Why is program 0205 the most successful?
Quoting from the description of program 0205:
“...naive strategies that only consider the value of the
upcard can easily become overwhelmed. For this reason,
my strategy involves a number of more sophisticated
elements here, including: (i) Tiered valuation of
cards, (ii) A learning algorithm based on monitoring
of historical play, (iii) Bounded random play, (iv)
Mitigations against learning algorithms.”
“Four versions of my Goofspiel algorithm were
created: maximize points (carryover), maximize
points (no carryover), maximize wins (carryover), and
maximize points (no carryover). Each version uses the
same basic set of strategies with a few unique features”.
We note that program 0205 considers the strategic
elements very carefully. For instance, “In Goofspiel
with no carryover and a goal of maximizing the
number of rounds won, the aim is to win one more
than half of the available points in a given round (to
win at least 46 points). As the game progresses ties
may occur causing points to be discarded and thus
lowering the total number of points needed to win.
Therefore at the start of each hand first calculate the
number of points sufficient to win: Winning Score = (My
Score + Opponent Score + Points remaining in deck)/2.”
To find the ‘playing path’ to the winning score, the
values of each card are added to find combinations
that have a sum greater than the winning score. Using
a tiered valuation system, these cards are stored in a
winners’ array because they are the cards that can win
the game in the minimum number of plays. Once the
winners have been determined, a second valuation tier
called helpers is created. Any two helper cards may be
used to replace any one winner card up to the highest
winner. In the first hand the helpers are 9, 8, 7, and 6.
The sum of any two helpers must be greater than or
equal to the highest winner e.g., five is not a helper
because despite 9 + 5 ≥ 13 being true, 6 + 5 ≥ 13 is not
true. The final tier of the valuation system is tossers,
which are cards that would require three or more to be
useful. As the game progresses, however, the number
of points needed to win changes for three reasons: (a)
ties, (b) you may loose cards in your shortest path to
victory, (c) you may win smaller cards, expanding your
victory path options.”...
“Monitoring Historic Play: If we have seen a single
card frequency ≥ 0.5 played for a given upcard, we
assume it is the card they will play thus will play that
card +1. If we do not have it, we try the next highest
card until we find one that is available.” In addition,
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0205 has what she referrers to as “Sanity Check: ...
If the card you are playing is more than three higher
than the upcard and the upcard is not a winner then
the bounded strategy takes over. Bounded Random
Play:...play one of the highest available cards, randomly
selected... However, if my opponent has cards higher
than all of the cards in my bounded subset, I play my
lowest available card.”
In summary, program 0205 presents a carefully
considered and very balanced approach for selecting
the play card in each turn. For extensions of strategy
0205 and a more complete evaluation of the success of
a modified version of program 0205, see [17].
B. Results for program 0205: The two objectives with
and without carryover – 50 round round-robin competi-
tions
Since one of the aims of this paper is to study the
differences in complexity and the objective functions of
the different competitions, we return to the round-robin
results to determine if the results suggest inherent
differences. Our conclusion is that there are inherent
differences in the results with respect to complexity and
the two objectives. We singled out program 0205 as the
representative program and restricted the examination to
the 50-round competitions. We report the performance
of program 0205 in the two dimensions against each of
the other nine programs in four 50-round competitions.
We observe a clear and consistent difference between
the results for Goofspiel with carryover (CO) and
without carryover (NCO) for both objectives. For
instance, playing 50 rounds against program 0201,
program 0205 won by 138 and 194 more points than
program 0201 when the objectives were, respectively,
Max the number of rounds won and Max the total points
won for the carryover games. Clearly, the objective
function does matter in the formulation of program 0205.
For the games with no carryover program 0205 won by
685 and 571 more points than program 0201 when the
objectives were, respectively, Max the number of rounds
won and Max the total points. With respect to number
of win differentials, program 0205 won by 10 rounds
more than program 0201 for both objectives in games
with carryover and by 28 and 21 rounds in games with
no carryover when the objectives were, respectively,
Max the number of rounds won and Max the total points.
Differences exist between the results in games with
and without carryover and even more drastic differences
with respect to the two objective functions. The results
depict drastic differences for the two game formats but
less drastic with respect to objectives, and the opposite
holds when program 0205 plays program 0206. When
playing 0206, program 0205 wins by points differentials
for both games and both objectives but looses by 7 both
times with respect to number of wins differentials when
maximizing the number of rounds won.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
To place the results of our tournament in perspective,
a comparison between the preset Goofspiel tournament
and Axelrod’s previous tournaments is warranted.
Essentially, viewing the finitely iterated PD game as the
E. Coli of social psychology ([2], p. 30), and finding
previous experimental literature on the PD to be of
no help, Axelrod proposed a computer tournament
for studying the effective choices in the iterated PD
game that satisfy two major requirements: (i) that the
effectiveness in playing the game depends not only
upon the characteristics of a particular strategy, but also
on the nature of other strategies with which it must
interact; (ii) that at any round of the game the effective
strategy should take into account the entire history of
the repeated interaction up to that point. To satisfy these
requirements, Axelrod made three important choices
that every tournament must consider: (1) the format
of the tournament, (2) the objective function that the
players are assumed to optimize, and (3) the population
of the contestants. Without giving an explanation as
to the reason, Axelrod opted to structure the multi-
player competition as a round-robin tournament. He
solicited programs from professional game theorists,
and instructed them to maximize the cumulative sum
of points won against all the competitors. None of
these choices is mandated by Axelrod’s original goal.
For instance, rather than structuring the competition as
a round-robin tournament, one might have structured
it as a single elimination tournament. As we stated
earlier, alternative objective functions might have been
proposed including maximization of the number of wins
or maximization of the cumulative point differential
across all competitors. There is also a choice between
alternative populations of players based on their
expertise or risk-taking attitude; in fact, in his second
tournament the request for a population of expert game
theorists was relaxed and, instead, the tournament was
open to the entire public. Our conjecture is that the
outcomes of the multiple tournaments of the iterated
PD reported in the literature in the last 30 years, and in
particular the predominance of TFT, do not generalize
beyond the particular combination of tournament format
and objective function that they all share.
Our search for effective strategies for Goofspiel was
predicated on the same three critical choices made
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by Axelrod. The participants were PhD students from
management information systems and computer science.
The project appeared to motivate them, as exhibited by
the time and effort they put into the devising com-
puter programs for the tournament. The multi-player
competition was similarly structured as a round-robin
tournament, thereby conditioning the effectiveness of any
particular strategy on the nature of all the strategies with
which it might interact. And one of the four variants of
the programs required the participants to maximize the
cumulative sum of points won against all the competitors
as in Axelrod’s tournament. However, the results of
the Goofspiel tournament could not have been more
different. The most effective strategy, that has dominated
the tournament in all the four variants of Goofspiel, does
not share the simple and highly transparent properties of
TFT or its extensions studied in [28], [37], and others.
In particular, it is a highly sophisticated program that
monitors the history of play, forms hypotheses about
the opponent, considers alternative strategies that are
conditioned on the state of the competition at any move,
and selectively randomizes the choice of cards in order
to keep the opponent off track. It has depth and balance,
not unlike the characteristics of a good chess computer
program, which are completely absent in TFT or its
extensions.
One possible reason for the difference between the
fundamental characteristics of these two efficient pro-
grams may have to do with the differences between the
two games. The only uncertainty in playing the iterated
PD game is strategic: A player does not know which
of the two options her opponent is about to choose on
any particular move. In contrast, the player in Goofspiel
faces two sources of uncertainty on any particular move,
one strategic and the other environmental due to the
random ordering of the cards in the suit that is being
exposed. In addition, the PD is a nonzero-sum game in
which the Pareto dominant outcome is achieved if both
players cooperate, whereas Goofspiel is a zero-sum game
in which preferences over the outcomes are diametrically
opposed, thereby excluding any incentive to cooperate.
Finally, whereas the PD presents each player with the
same binary choice on each move, Goofspiel presents
each player with multiple options that differ across
moves. These features of Goofspiel, which may exist in
other repeatedly interactive games in one combination or
another, call for considerable sophistication and balance
between different objectives in devising efficient strate-
gies. Chess, Go, and backgammon, all zero-sum games
that still defy complete analysis, serve as instructive
examples.
VIII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This paper has tackled Goofspiel in the same way Ax-
elrod tackled the Prisoner?s Dilemma. That is, we invited
competitors to participate, and conducted a round- robin
competition. We restricted the number of entries to Ph.D.
students. It would be interesting to open the competition
to a larger number of competitors. Given the access that
we now have to social media, email etc. (which Axelrod
never had) it should be possible to hold a much larger
competition, which should provide further insights.
As we discuss in Section IV, learning in games has
a long and varied, history. It would be interesting to
investigate some of the methodologies that others have
utilized on Goofspiel. Monte Carlo Tree Search might
prove useful in searching for the best card to play. It
would also be interesting to consider evolutionary and
co-evolutionary approaches in seeking good Goofspiel
strategies.
Since the time that Axelrod popularized the Prisoner?s
Dilemma a lot of research has been conducted, much
of which has studied the game from a theoretical point
of view. There has been limited theoretical work on
Goofspiel, and this might prove to be a fruitful research
direction.
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TABLE IV
NUMBER OF OPPONENTS DEFEATED BY POINTS AND ROUNDS WITH
ROUND OBJ.: NO CARRYOVER
Max # of W. Rounds, 50 Rounds, No Carryover
Players # of O. Def. by Points # of O. Def. by Rounds
Wins Loses Wins Ties Loses
0209 5 5 5 0 5
0205 10 0 9 0 1
0203 4 6 4 0 6
0210 4 6 4 0 6
0207 6 4 7 0 3
0206 5 5 8 0 2
0202 4 6 4 0 6
0204 1 9 2 0 8
0208 6 4 5 0 5
0201 8 2 8 0 2
Random 1 9 1 0 9
TABLE V
NUMBER OF OPPONENTS DEFEATED BY POINTS AND ROUNDS WITH
POINTS OBJ.; NO CARRYOVER
Max Total Points, 50 Rounds, No Carryover
Players # of O. Def. by Points # of O. Def. by Rounds
Wins Loses Wins Ties Loses
0209 2 8 2 1 7
0205 10 0 10 0 0
0203 6 4 5 0 5
0210 4 6 4 1 5
0207 5 5 6 0 4
0206 6 4 5 1 4
0202 4 6 3 1 6
0204 3 7 3 0 7
0208 6 4 5 0 5
0201 8 2 8 0 2
Random 1 9 1 0 9
TABLE VI
NUMBER OF OPPONENTS DEFEATED BY POINTS AND ROUNDS WITH
POINTS OBJ.; CARRYOVER
Max Total Points, 50 Rounds, Carryover
Players # of O. Def. by Points # of O. Def. by Rounds
Wins Loses Wins Ties Loses
0209 5 5 5 0 5
0205 10 0 10 0 0
0203 5 5 4 0 6
0210 5 5 5 1 4
0207 4 6 3 0 7
0206 3 7 4 0 6
0202 6 4 5 1 4
0204 2 8 2 0 8
0208 7 3 7 1 2
0201 8 2 7 1 2
Random 1 9 1 0 9
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TABLE VII
NUMBER OF OPPONENTS DEFEATED BY POINTS AND ROUNDS WITH
ROUND OBJ.; CARRYOVER
Max # of W. Rounds, 50 Rounds, Carryover
Players # of O. Def. by Points # of O. Def. by Rounds
Wins Loses Wins Ties Loses
0209 5 5 5 0 5
0205 9 1 8 0 2
0203 4 6 4 0 6
0210 6 4 6 0 4
0207 3 7 3 0 7
0206 5 5 5 0 5
0202 5 5 5 0 5
0204 2 8 2 0 8
0208 9 1 9 0 1
0201 7 3 7 0 3
Random 1 9 1 0 9
TABLE VIII
FREQUENCY OF DEFEATED PROGRAMS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0201 9 7 7 7 9 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7
0202 4 3 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 6 5 5 5
0203 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 6 5 5 4 4 4
0204 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
0205 10 9 10 9 8 5 9 7 10 9 10 10 10 10 9 8
0206 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 5 8 6 5 3 4 5 5
0207 5 6 6 6 5 4 3 3 6 7 5 6 4 3 3 3
0208 7 6 6 4 6 6 9 8 6 5 6 5 7 7 9 9
0209 7 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5
0210 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6
Rand. 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
